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KUNKEL

RATIONING JUSTICE IN THE 21ST CENTURY:
TECHNOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY
IN THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE MOVEMENT
REBECCA KUNKEL*

INTRODUCTION
More than fifty years since the creation of a federal Legal Services Program with the mission to “marshall the forces of law to combat
the causes and effects of poverty,”1 a growing proportion of the legal
needs of the nation’s poor and working classes are going unmet.2
Awareness that there is a broadening “justice gap” is widespread in the
legal profession.3 However, the inherently political questions raised by
this state of affairs, and what it suggests about our national commitments to ideals of justice and equality, have been largely obscured by a
barrage of policy discussions proposing modest technical interventions.4
This paper will attempt to bring the technocratic discourse surrounding the justice gap into dialog with these larger political questions.
The argument proceeds in three parts. In Part II, I place the justice gap
discussion into the wider context of the history of federally funded legal
aid. While major events in this history have been documented elsewhere, the tendency of many recent proposals aimed at redressing the
© 2018 Rebecca Kunkel
* Reference and Metadata Librarian, Rutgers Law Library, Newark, New Jersey. I am grateful
to David Dunham, Allen Kim, Athena Mutua, Eve Ross, and Kathryn Sabbeth for their insightful comments on a previous draft of this paper.
1 William P. Quigley, The Demise of Law Reform and the Triumph of Legal Aid: Congress and
the Legal Services Corporation from the 1960s to the 1990s, 17 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 241,
246 (1998) (quoting a speech given by then-director of LSP in 1965, delivered to the National
Legal Aid and Defender Association).
2 See The Justice Gap: Measuring the Unmet Civil Legal Needs of Low-income Americans,
LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1, 30 (2017), https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/images/TheJusticeGap-FullReport.pdf [hereinafter The Justice Gap] (“Low-income Americans receive inadequate or no professional legal help for 86% of the civil legal problems they face in a given
year.”).
3 See James D. Abrams & Ann Hancock, The Justice Gap and Pro Bono Legal, AM. BAR ASSOC.
(Feb. 14, 2017), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/commercial-business/spotlight/2017/justice-gap-pro-bono-legal/.
4 See infra Part IV.
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justice gap has been to gloss over historical and political conditions, obscuring the relationship between the justice gap, conservative opposition to federal legal aid, and the broader bipartisan project of welfare
retrenchment and neoliberalization that took place over the past four
decades.5 Part III will shift focus to the normative discourse surrounding
access to justice.6 In this part, I argue that a major current of thought
within the access to justice movement has chosen to focus on narrow,
technical interventions in the court system and legal services agencies.
This current of thought—which takes both poverty and inadequate levels of investment in services to the poor as a given—developed out of a
pervasive neoliberal political rationality which limits the parameters of
acceptable discourse, and operates to suppress awareness of the ideological or structural dimensions of these policy discussions.7 Part IV develops this thesis in further detail by analyzing a particular but frequently repeated theme: that technological developments will “fix” to
the problems presented by the justice gap.8
II.

THE ACCESS TO JUSTICE MOVEMENT IN THE UNITED
STATES

The contemporary understanding of the term access to justice
emerged from the legal profession's mid-century debates over provision
of legal representation to the poor, where it was often used to describe
the purpose of legal aid.9 By the late 1970s, federal funding for legal aid
had become firmly established, and the model of the public interest law
firm appeared to have taken hold as a means to continue to enforce and
expand the gains of the rights revolution of the 1960s.10 It was at this
time that access to justice began to take on the appearance of a cohesive
social movement.11 This appearance was fostered in large part by Mauro
Cappelletti and Bryant Garth’s influential four volume study, published
in 1978, which documented access to justice in Europe and the United

5

See infra Part II.
See infra Part III.
7 Id.
8 See infra Part IV.
9 Marc Galanter, Access to Justice in a World of Expanding Social Capability, 37 FORDHAM
URB. L.J. 115, 116 n.3 (2010).
10 See STEVEN M. TELES, THE RISE OF THE CONSERVATIVE LEGAL MOVEMENT: THE BATTLE FOR
CONTROL OF THE LAW 56 (2008) (discussing the “development of the liberal legal network”
based on numerous factors, including the “social disruptions of the 1960s,” and “critical funding
and strategic coordination for its emerging infrastructure”).
11 See MAURO CAPPELLETTI & BRYANT GARTH, ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY 21
(Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds., 1978).
6
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States.12 This study was structured around what Cappelletti identified as
three “waves” of the movement: legal aid, followed by public interest
litigation, and more recently, efforts to simplify the legal process and
introduce alternative dispute resolution measures.13 Although few discussions of access to justice since this time have treated the phrase as
narrowly signifying the purpose of legal aid, the availability of legal
representation for the poor remained a central concern.14 Cappelletti was
careful to stress the limits of the wave metaphor, emphasizing the continued relevancy and even centrality of legal aid in ensuring access to
justice.15 Today, it is frequently the case that contemporary authors
point out the basic inadequacy of legal aid and the need for access to
justice to involve major departures from the premise of attorney-provided legal representation for the poor.16 Nonetheless, the legal aid paradigm still functions as a starting point for this discussion, indicating its
continued significance.
The nation’s legal aid system went through rapid change and expansion in the 1960s, as funding for legal aid attorneys went from being
almost entirely private and locally provided, to being supported by a
federal agency with a broad mission to provide legal services to all
Americans who were in need of but unable to afford them.17 From the
time of the earliest legal aid societies in the 1870s until 1964, legal aid
The four-volume study is based on a four-year comparative research project entitled “Florence
Access-to-Justice Project,” sponsored by the Ford Foundation and, with slightly more local focus, the Italian National Council of Research (CNR). The volumes, under the general editorship
of Mauro Cappelletti are: VOLUME I. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: A WORLD SURVEY (Mauro Cappelletti
& Bryant Garth eds.); VOLUME II. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: STUDIES OF PROMISING INSTITUTIONS
(Mauro Cappelletti & John Weisner eds.); VOLUME III. ACCESS TO JUSTICE: EMERGING
PERSPECTIVES AND ISSUES (Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth eds.); and VOLUME IV. PATTERNS
IN CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: ESSAYS IN THE ETHNOGRAPHY OF LAW. ACCESS TO JUSTICE IN AN
ANTHROPOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE (Klaus-Friedrich Koch ed.). Bryant G. Garth & Mauro Cappelletti, Access to Justice: The Newest Wave in the Worldwide Movement to Make Rights Effective, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 181, 181 (1978).
13 CAPPELLETTI & GARTH, supra note 11, at 21.
14 See infra Part III.
15 Mauro Cappelletti & Bryant Garth, Access to Justice and the Welfare State: An Introduction,
in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE WELFARE STATE 5–6 (Mauro Cappelletti et al. eds., 1981). In
response to the question of whether the wave metaphor should be taken literally to imply a
succession that replaces the previous waves, the authors commented:
Our view is that the third phase in the access-to-justice movement should
be seen as an absorption, not a replacement of the first two. The three should
embody a coherent effort to enforce and expand the new rights that now
belong to the underprivileged sectors of society–the poor, tenants, consumers, environmentalists, employees.
Id.
16 See infra notes 83–85 and accompanying text.
17 See infra notes 19–29 and accompanying text.
12

KUNKEL

2018]

RATIONING JUSTICE

369

had been administered locally through charitable organizations, municipalities, and attorney pro bono, resulting in a patchwork system which
tended to concentrate around large urban centers.18 The 1960s saw the
country’s first efforts to coordinate and fund legal aid on a national scale
through the Legal Services Program (LSP), a department within the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO).19 Part of LSP’s agenda was to
support the work of existing legal aid societies by funding individual
representation, and the program was credited with more than quadrupling the number of lawyers able to devote their careers to legal aid from
about 600 nationally in 1964 to over 2,500 a decade later.20 However,
due partly to the larger goals of the OEO and its role in the Johnson
administration’s War on Poverty, and partly in recognition of the limits
that its budget placed on the goal of universal representation, the early
LSP also stressed a more ambitious goal: to use legal aid cases instrumentally to accomplish systemic reforms that would mitigate and address the causes of poverty.21
The idea of using public funds to effectuate changes in the
established legal order was never without tension, and the Legal
Services Program met with vigorous opposition almost from its
inception.22 Perhaps the most notorious examples took place in
California in the 1960’s. In 1967, California Rural Legal Assistance
(CRLA) won several high-profile victories in short succession with the
aid of funds from LSP.23 In the first high-profile case, Morris v.
Williams, CRLA lawyers successfully invalidated restrictions on
California medical assistance which had been promulgated by recentlyelected governor Ronald Reagan as part of a larger effort to cut the
state’s various welfare programs.24 In a second case, Ortiz v. Wirtz,
CRLA won a victory against the state’s powerful agricultural interests
when it invalidated a Department of Labor ruling that had permitted
18

Quigley, supra note 1, at 243–45.
Id. at 245.
20 Gary Bellow, Legal Services to the Poor: An American Report, in ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND
THE WELFARE STATE 49, 49–50 (Mauro Cappelletti ed., 1981).
21 See Stephen K. Huber, Thou Shalt Not Ration Justice: History and Bibliography of Legal Aid,
44 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 754, 759–60 (1976) (“Law reform through test case litigation had become the primary goal of local Legal Services Programs because they had far more clients than
could be served effectively.”); Quigley, supra note 1, at 245–46 (noting that LSP “placed a high
priority on reform of the law to make it more responsive to the poor”).
22 Walter Karabian, Legal Services for the Poor: Some Political Observations, 6 U. S.F. L. REV.
253, 256 (1972).
23 Id. at 257.
24 Morris v. Williams, 67 Cal. 2d. 733, 784 (Cal. 1967); EARL JOHNSON, JR., TO ESTABLISH
JUSTICE FOR ALL: THE PAST AND FUTURE OF CIVIL LEGAL AID IN THE UNITED STATES 122–23
(2014).
19
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farm owners to bring in low-wage workers from Mexico.25 Governor
Reagan responded in 1968 with a thwarted attempt to veto CRLA's
receipt of federal funds,26 a move which foreshadowed what would become continued antagonism towards LSC during his presidential administration.27 CRLA’s successes also propelled California Senator George
Murphy to propose legislation that would have prevented LSP-funded
attorneys from suing government entities,28 the first in a series of efforts
to restrict the efficacy of legal services lawyers which would eventually
prove successful.29
At the time that the Legal Services Corporation (LSC) was created in 1974, supporters widely viewed it as a means to isolate the Legal
Services Program from direct political pressure by removing it from the
executive branch.30 This danger posed by direct executive control of the
agency was poignantly exposed during the Nixon administration, with
Nixon’s appointment of Howard Philips to head LSP.31 Philips was a
vocal opponent of legal services who “had as his first order of business
a plan to dismantle the program.”32 Although Nixon vetoed the original
bill in 1971, a compromise bill creating the Legal Services Corporation
was eventually signed into law in 1974, shortly before his resignation.33
The 1974 Act successfully placed the administration of Legal Services
in an independent government corporation, but the hope that this move
would insulate the program from political interference proved to be
short lived.34 As it stood, LSC depended on Congress to re-appropriate
funds for the program annually.35
Conservative opponents were galvanized by the idea of “leftist”
attorneys receiving public funds to further the “radical” agenda of

25

Ortiz v. Wirtz, No. 47803 (N.D. Cal. 1967); JOHNSON, supra note 24, at 124.
Jerome B. Falk, Jr. & Stuart R. Pollak, Political Interference with Publicly Funded Lawyers:
The CRLA Controversy and The Future of Legal Services, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 599, 609 (1973).
27
Robert Hornstein et al., The Politics of Equal Justice, 11 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L.
1089, 1096 (2003). See Quigley, supra note 1, at 257–59 (discussing how LSC was “being
starved financially” in the 1980s).
28 Falk & Pollak, supra note 26, at 609 (citing 113 CONG. REC. 27,871 (1967)).
29 See infra notes 44–60 and accompanying text.
30 Quigley, supra note 1, at 251–52.
31 Id. at 253.
32 Hornstein et al., supra note 27, at 1094.
33 Quigley, supra note 1, at 252–53.
34 Id. at 253–54.
35 Id.
26
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reshaping the legal system,36 and the annual battle over appropriations
proved to be an opportunity ripe for opposition.37 In 1981, President
Reagan’s first annual budget proposal eliminated all direct funding for
LSC.38 While Congress ultimately rejected the plan, the resulting compromise cut the agency’s budget by over 25% in a single year, from
$321 million to $241 million.39 While Reagan failed in his attempt to
abolish LSC completely, a major consequence of the attempt was that
much-reduced levels of funding became the agency’s new normal.40
After reaching a high point in 1981, federal funding for legal services
did not recover to prior levels until 1992.41 When adjusted for inflation,
the descent was even more striking—in real dollars, LSC has never
come close to its 1981 level of funding in all of the years since. 42 This
decline in LSC’s funding has occurred in spite of the fact that over the
same period, the poverty rate has continued to fluctuate between about
12-15% of the total population, and the total number of Americans living in poverty has grown from about 30 million in 1980 to 43.1 million
in 2015.43
Since LSC fixes its eligibility criteria as a percentage of the national poverty level, the number of Americans living in poverty has a
direct bearing on the demand for its services.44 However, the period of
time between 1980 and 2015 also saw precipitous growth in rates of
income and wealth inequality after a brief leveling off during the mid-

36

Id. at 255 n.88 (quoting a 1981 letter written by Howard Phillips on behalf of the National
Defeat Legal Services Committee).
37 See id. at 255–59 (discussing the constant struggle LSC faced in terms of federal funding).
38 Stuart Taylor, Jr., House Action Near in Fight Over Legal Aid, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/06/16/us/house-action-near-in-fight-over-legal-aid.html.
39 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Legal Services Agency Struggles for its Survival, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 13,
1981),
http://www.nytimes.com/1981/11/13/us/legal-services-agency-struggles-for-its-survival.html.
40 Quigley, supra note 1, at 256–58 (noting Reagan’s strategies of “reduced funding, increased
restrictions and unsympathetic leadership” to bring about a “slow, painful death” to LSC).
41 2013 LSC by the Numbers: The Data Underlying Legal Aid Programs, LEGAL SERVS. CORP.
(July 2014), http://www.lsc.gov/media-center/publications/2013-lsc-numbers [hereinafter 2013
LSC by the Numbers].
42 Id.
43 BERNADETTE D. PROCTOR ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, P60-256(RV), INCOME AND POVERTY
IN THE UNITED STATES: 2015 12 (2016), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2016/demo/p60-256.pdf.
44 See 45 C.F.R. § 1611.3(c)(1) (2017) (“As part of its financial eligibility policies, every recipient shall establish annual income ceilings for individuals and households, which may not exceed one hundred and twenty five perfect (125%) of the current official Federal Poverty Guidelines amount.”).
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twentieth century.45While the relationship between rising material inequality and the need for legal services is less obvious, this trend may be
at least partly responsible for an increasing number of individuals who
do not meet the formal criteria for pro bono legal services but who are
also unable to afford legal representation at market rates.46 Some authors have noted the existence of an “access to justice paradox” in that
high levels of potential clients who cannot afford the services of attorney currently exist alongside high levels of underemployment or unemployment among recent law graduates.47 Lobel and Chapman cite evidence that during the period between 2000 and 2012, the median
household income had a net gain of only 3% while average hourly legal
fees increased 12%.48 This evidence suggests that demand at the top of
the income scale has played a role in pricing potential low and middleincome clients out of the legal services market, as has the overall decline
in working and middle class economic standing.49
The narrowing potential for LSC attorneys to engage in broad
law reform efforts have compounded the difficulties associated with
severely limited funding. Over the years, political clashes over LSC
have resulted in substantive restrictions on the types of cases and
activities that LSC-funded law offices are permitted handle, in turn
negating the early LSP/LSC strategy of using law reform to make the
most effective use of its limited budget. 50 The initial compromise that
established the LSC in 1974 was an early example: the law that
attempted to save the Legal Services Program by insulating it from
politics also prevented attorneys from using LSC funds to represent
clients in certain types of controversial cases, including abortion and
school desegregation cases.51 By the 1990s, despite more than a decade
of declining funding, renewed conservative opposition to LSC in
Congress, led by Newt Gingrich, nearly resulted in the agency once
45

THOMAS PICKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 294 (Arthur Goldhammer trans.,
2014).
46 See Vincent Morris, Navigating Justice: Self-Help Resources, Access to Justice, and Whose
Job is it Anyway?, 82 MISS. L.J. SUPRA 161, 165 (2013) (noting that as funding for free legal
services declines, the number of pro se litigants will likely increase).
47 Jules Lobel & Matthew Chapman, Bridging the Gap Between Unmet Legal Needs and an
Oversupply of Lawyers: Creating Neighborhood Law Offices – The Philadelphia Experiment,
22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 71, 72 (2015).
48 Id. at 79.
49 See id. at 79–80 (showing that as median household income contracted, average hourly legal
fees continued to rise leaving middle-income legal consumers “worse” off).
50 See Quigley, supra note 1, at 248–60 (highlighting LSC’s clash with the federal government
beginning in the 1960’s which “ultimately damaged the LSC by a combination of drastic funding cuts and the most severe restrictions on law reform activity”).
51 Id. at 253.
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again being phased out of existence completely.52 In another
compromise designed to save LSC from oblivion, the 1996
appropriations bill—which continued to fund LSC albeit at a much
reduced rate—included even more draconian restrictions on the
activities of those receiving LSC funds.53 These restrictions, many of
which remain in effect,54 included prohibitions on some of the most effective tools for effectuating legal change, including class action lawsuits,55 lobbying,56 and training for political activities.57 It also included
further subject matter and clientele restrictions, preventing LSC attorneys from representing clients in abortion cases,58 in prisoners’ rights
cases,59 and in litigation undertaken on behalf of non-citizens under certain circumstances.60
In 2005, after many years faced with efforts to undermine its
mission though a combination of declining funding and activity restrictions, LSC published the first version of its widely cited report,
Documenting the Justice Gap in America.61 Among the report’s conclusions, about one in every two potential legal services clients were being
turned down due to insufficient agency resources.62 Moreover, this
“gap” did not appear to be filled either through alternate funding sources
such as state or local level public funding or attorney pro bono.63 An
52 JOHNSON, supra note 24,
53 Quigley, supra note 1, at

at 734.
260–61.
54 See Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-31, 131 Stat. 218 (2017). The
restrictions adopted in the Omnibus Consolidated Rescissions and Appropriations Act of 1996,
Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321-53 (1996), subject to amendments passed by Departments
of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related Agencies Appropriation Act, 1998,
Pub. L. No. 105-119, 111 Stat. 2510-11 (1998), have been carried forward as conditions on
LSC’s funding to the current fiscal year. Id. In 2001, the Supreme Court upheld the act in part.
Legal Servs. Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 549 (2001) (invalidating Pub. L. No. 104-134,
§ 504(a)(16) which prohibited the LSC from participation in “litigation, lobbying, or rulemaking, involving an effort to reform a Federal or State welfare system[,]” but finding that it was
severable from the rest of the act).
55 § 504(a)(7), 110 Stat. at 53.
56 § 504(a)(2)–(4), 110 Stat. at 53.
57 § 504(12), 110 Stat. at 55.
58 § 504(14), 110 Stat. at 55.
59 § 504(15), 110 Stat. at 55.
60 § 504(11), 110 Stat. at 54–55.
61 Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of LowIncome Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. (2005), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/images/justicegap.pdf. Although this is the second edition of Documenting the
Justice Gap in America, it is “virtually the same” as the 2005 edition and the “only substantive
changes are the addition of [a] Preface and [an] updated list of the Board of Directors . . . .” Id.
62 Id. at 4.
63 Id.
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updated report published in 2009 found that despite a slight increase in
funding in the intervening years, about half of the individuals who
sought assistance from LSC-funded offices were still being turned away
due to insufficient resources.64
Documenting the Justice Gap in America and its conclusions
about the unmet need for civil counsel have been widely cited in subsequent discussions of access to justice.65 Curiously, the result of much of
this influence has not generally been, as one might assume, to renew a
vigorous critique of the substantive and financial restrictions on federally funded legal aid offices, but rather a growing sense of the justice
gap as a given and the chronic state of inadequate funding as an immovable force of nature.66
Part of what has enabled this reification of the justice gap is a
common tendency to consider the problem separately from the larger
political context from which it emerged. As the CLRA incidents illustrated, a vigorous legal aid system could be used to directly challenge
both state power and the power of private business interests.67 Whether
accurately perceived or not, this threat inspired decades of sustained,
ideologically motivated opposition to LSC in Congress and the Executive Branch.68 It is only by ignoring this context that the justice gap
could appear to be either natural or inevitable.
The failure to attend to this historical context continues to obscure the relationship between the decline of LSC, the growth of the
justice gap, and the broader process of welfare retrenchment and
64

Documenting the Justice Gap in America: The Current Unmet Civil Legal Needs of LowIncome Americans, LEGAL SERVS. CORP. 1–2 (2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf.
65 See, e.g., Debra Gardner, Justice Delayed Is, Once Again, Justice Denied: The Overdue Right
to Counsel in Civil Cases, 37 BALT. L. REV. 59, 61 n.20 (2007); Rebecca Sharpless, More Than
One Lane Wide: Against Hierarchies of Helping in Progressive Legal Advocacy, 19 CLINICAL
L. REV. 247, 352 n.25 (2012); Daniel Vandekoolwyk, Threshold Obstacles to Justice: The Interaction of Procedural and Substantive Law in the United States, France, and China, 23 PAC.
MCGEORGE GLOBAL BUS. & DEV. L.J. 187, 192 n.33 (2010).
66 See John P. Gross, Dispelling the Myth that Law Students Can Close the Justice Gap, 58 B.C.
L. REV. 26, 32–33 (2017) (arguing that “states need to adequately fund the indigent defense delivery systems”); James J. Sandman, President, Legal Services Corporation, Hawaii Access to
Justice Conference: Rethinking Access to Justice (June 20, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.lsc.gov/rethinking-access-justice-james-j-sandman-hawaii-access-justice-conference) (asserting that “accepting” the lack of legal services as the result of inadequate funding is
a form of “complacency”).
67 See supra notes 22–26 and accompanying text.
68 See supra notes 26–49 and accompanying text.
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neoliberalization in American domestic policy. The economic crises of
the 1970s helped to destabilize the dominant paradigm of Keynesian
economic policy typified by the New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great
Society.69 This legitimation crisis helped fuel the electoral successes for
Reagan and other New Right politicians, who wove the neoliberal critique of Keynesianism into narratives of rugged individualism, personal
responsibility, and family values.70 The goals of economic prosperity
and moral rectitude were tightly intertwined in this narrative: both
would require dismantling the overgrown “nanny state”71 and empowering the private sector through schemes of deregulation, privatization,
and tax cuts.72
Neoliberalism’s ascendance unleashed what David Harvey described as a sustained “assault upon institutions, such as trade unions
and welfare rights organizations, that sought to protect and further
working-class interests,” accompanied by “savage cutbacks in social expenditures and the welfare state, and the passing of all responsibility for
their well-being to individuals and their families.”73 The fact that these
efforts were ever only partly successful has nonetheless left a much tattered social safety net to cope with the problems brought on by rising
wealth inequality. Unfortunately, in the case of legal aid, even its supporters have tended focus rather myopically on the “justice gap” as an
isolated phenomenon, rather than as a symptom of the broader problem
of widening inequality associated with widespread adoption of neoliberal social policies.74 This narrow focus has, in turn, severely constrained the ability to engage in a critique of the chronic state of
69 JAMIE PECK, CONSTRUCTIONS OF NEOLIBERAL REASON 122 (2014).
70 DANIEL STEDMAN JONES, MASTERS OF THE UNIVERSE: HAYEK, FRIEDMAN, AND THE

BIRTH OF
NEOLIBERAL POLITICS 11–12, 86 (2012).
71 A “nanny state” is described as a “paternalistic government” in which the “nanny who, by
intervening in her protégés’ autonomy ostensibly for their own good, infantilizes them and renders them incapable of exercising that autonomy.” JULIAN LE GRAND & BILL NEW,
GOVERNMENT PATERNALISM: NANNY STATE OR HELPFUL FRIEND? 109 (2015).
72 See id. at 263–64 (discussing Reagan’s economic policy which focused on four things: “increased deregulation and market liberalization, tighter control of the money supply, tax cuts,
and cuts in public spending”). See generally Edward L. Rubin, Deregulation, Reregulation and
the Myth of the Market, 45 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1249, 1258 (1998) (“In its classic form, economic analysis demonstrates that a free market will maximize wealth, while a regulated market,
one in which the government intervenes for reasons other than the correction of market failure,
will not.”).
73 David Harvey, Neoliberalism as Creative Destruction, 610 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC.
SCI. 22, 32 (2007).
74 See generally What We Do, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/about-lsc/what-we-do
(last visited Dec. 24, 2018) (stating that the Legal Services Corporation’s mission is focused on
“providing legal assistance to those who face an economic barrier to adequate counsel will serve
best the ends of justice and assist in improving opportunities for low-income persons”).
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underfunding for legal services or to imagine responses to the problem
from outside the framework of neoliberal assumptions.
III.

TECHNOCRACY

Over the past four decades, neoliberalism has gone from an explicit challenge to Keynesianism to constituting a large part of the status
quo in not only economics but in political thought as well.75 As this
process unfolded, the normative discourse explicitly directed at justifying neoliberal policy prescriptions has given way to what political philosophers have termed a “political rationality”: a mode of reasoning,
with a set of more or less implicit metaphysical and ethical assumptions,
which sets the terms for discussing the legitimate exercise of power.76
In Wendy Brown’s77 account of neoliberal political rationality, a central
feature that marks neoliberalism as distinct from other normative discourses is the emergence of market-based norms as the dominant ones
across all spheres, including what, under classical liberal thought, was
typically regarded as a separate realm of political life.78
This proliferation of market norms has far reaching consequences, but of particular relevance to the topic at hand is the emergence
of the concept of “governance,” which replaces the political act of governing with dissemination of managerial norms and application of expertise.79 Brown argues that as a consequence of neoliberalism’s substitution of the managerialist concept of governance:
[P]ublic life is reduced to problem solving and program
implementation, a casting that brackets or eliminates politics, conflict, and deliberation about common values or
ends . . . . As problem solving replaces deliberation about
social conditions and possible political futures, as consensus replaces contestation among diverse perspectives,
political life is emptied of what theorists such as
75 JONES, supra note
76 WENDY BROWN,

70, at 263.
UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH REVOLUTION 120–21

(2015).
77 Wendy Brown is Class of 1936 First Chair of Political Science at the University of California,
Berkeley. Professor Brown’s fields of interest include the history of political theory, nineteenth
and twentieth century Continental theory, critical theory, and theories of contemporary capitalism. Wendy Brown, BERKELEY POL. SCI., http://polisci.berkeley.edu/people/person/wendybrown (last visited Dec. 16, 2018).
78 BROWN, supra note 76, at 108–09.
79 Id. at 126–27.
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Machiavelli took to be its heart and the index of its
health: robust expressions of different political positions
and desires.80
These observations provide a useful starting point for understanding the proliferation of technocratic responses to the justice gap.
LSC’s own recent direction has reinforced the ahistorical impression
that the justice gap is an intractable problem built into the nature of the
project of providing full service legal assistance to the poor.81 The premise of a 2012 LSC-sponsored Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access to Justice was the need to transform LSC’s mode of “service delivery” through the use of technology in light of the conclusions
it reached in Documenting the Justice Gap in America.82 Others have
taken up the suggestion that there is something flawed in the basic idea
of legal services programs. For example, one 2015 article remarked:
After a generation of efforts to increase the funding for
legal services, to expand the types of cases in which indigent civil litigants are entitled to counsel at public expense, and to expand the amount of pro bono services
donated by the private bar, it is unrealistic—given current resource limitations and demand for legal help—to
expect that we can provide a lawyer for every poor person with an essential civil legal need, let alone every person of modest means with such a problem. 83

80

Id. at 127.
See The Justice Gap, supra note 2, at 9 (“This ‘justice gap’ – the difference between civil
legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet those needs – has
stretched into a gulf.”).
82 Report of The Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access to Justice, LEGAL SERVS.
CORP.
1–2
(2013),
https://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC_Tech%20Summit%20Report_2013.pdf [hereinafter Summit Report] (“Technology can and must play a vital role in transforming service delivery so that all poor people in the
United States with an essential civil legal need obtain some form of effective assistance.”).
83 John M. Greacen et al., From Market Failure to 100% Access: Toward a Civil Justice Continuum, 37 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 551, 552–53 (2015). See James J. Sandman, The Current State of Access to Justice in the United States, 22 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 453, 458
(2015) (“We are in many ways still dealing with a service delivery model that was originally
created with the noble goal of providing a lawyer for every individual person . . . . We need to
identify other types of service that might provide meaningful assistance to unrepresented people.”); James J. Sandman, President, Legal Services Corporation, Hawaii Access to Justice Conference: Rethinking Access to Justice (June 20, 2014) (transcript available at
https://www.lsc.gov/rethinking-access-justice-james-j-sandman-hawaii-access-justice81
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Such accounts of the failure of legal aid ignore its highly
politicized history, and instead attribute its failure to provide universal
access to justice to poor “design.”84 This causal narrative helps to frame
the pursuit of access to justice as an essentially apolitical project of
fixing a flawed but ideologically neutral design. Particular suggestions
for the nature of the improved design vary: they range from the creation
of new, more efficient, forms for the organization of law offices; 85 to
the development and improvement of self-help tools;86 to the
deregulation of legal practice.87 In a 2011 article, court consultant
conference) (“In light of the realities we face, we need to rethink the goal of the access to justice
movement. Is it to provide full representation for every client in every case? That is not realistic
. . . . The fact is that some assistance is better than no assistance.”).
84 See CHARLES L. OWEN ET AL., ACCESS TO JUSTICE: MEETING THE NEEDS OF SELF REPRESENTED
LITIGANTS 3 (2002) (arguing that the “American ideal for justice” is attainable by “systematically removing the unnecessary, simplifying the necessary, and rethinking processes from the
standpoints of those who must use them”).
85 See generally Raymond H. Brescia et al., Embracing Disruption: How Technological
Changes in the Delivery of Legal Services Can Improve Access to Justice, 78 ALB. L. REV. 553,
554 (2015) (discussing how “true disruption” in the legal field is “likely to come from those
serving the ‘lower end’ of the market,” including “solo practitioners, legal services lawyers, and
‘low bono’ providers of legal services”); Benjamin P. Cooper, Access to Justice Without Lawyers, 47 AKRON L. REV. 205, 208 (2014) (describing the rise of standardized pro se forms in
various jurisdictions); Michael J. Wolf, Collaborative Technology Improves Access to Justice,
15 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL’Y 759, 771–72 (2012) (outlining nascent collaborative legal
technologies and tools which low-income individuals “understand and [can] use to efficiently
engage with the legal forum”).
86 See Rochelle Klempner, The Case for Court-Based Document Assembly Programs: A Review
of the New York State Court System’s “DIY” Forms, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1189, 1189 (2014)
(exploring New York’s pro se form programs and court-based document assembly programs);
Ronald W. Staudt, All the Wild Possibilities: Technology That Attacks Barriers to Access to
Justice, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1117, 1117 (2009) (discussing the new software tool “A2J Author”
which serves as an “interface for public access to legal processes” and provides “the connection
to the customer”); Richard Zorza, Self-Represented Litigants and the Access to Justice Revolution in the State Courts: Cross-Pollinating Perspectives Toward a Dialogue for Innovation in
the Courts and the Administrative Law System, 29 J. NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 63, 68–
78 (2009) (describing “accessing the system innovations” which “provide…a comprehensive
picture of the claim” and “give the litigant himself a fuller understanding of the claim” thus
making the hearing “more efficient and more comprehensive”). See generally Cooper, supra
note 85; Wolf, supra note 85.
87 See generally Deborah J. Cantrell, The Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 883 (2004) (reviewing the case for eliminating unauthorized practice of law restrictions); Cooper, supra note 63 (examining ways in which “consumers are gaining greater access to the justice system without using lawyers”); Gillian K.
Hadfield & Deborah L. Rhode, How to Regulate Legal Service to Promote Access, Innovation,
and the Quality of Lawyering, 67 HASTINGS L.J. 1191 (2016) (arguing that “good regulatory
solutions are available to ensure that more open and flexile professional models – ones that
allow the practice of law by alternative provides and business structures – deliver high quality,
lower cost, greater innovation, and more access to those currently excluded from our justice
systems”); Marcus J. Lock, Increasing Access to Justice: Expanding the Role of Nonlawyers in
the Delivery of Legal Services to Low-Income Coloradans, 72 U. COLO. L. REV. 459 (2001)
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Richard Zorza dubbed a confluence of such approaches—which he
summarized as “court simplification and services, bar flexibility, legal
aid efficiency and availability, and systems of triage and assignment”—
part of an “emerging consensus” on how best to deal with the justice
gap.88 The common denominator which links these suggestions together
is the underlying promise that individual action, entrepreneurialism, and
innovation will generate a universally palatable solutions without the
need to engage conflicting viewpoints or make difficult decisions between competing values.
These uncritical concessions neoliberal rationality—and especially to the primacy of individualistic norms emphasizing voluntary,
technical solutions to social problems—undermine the very vocabulary
that would allow us to conceive of problems faced by the poor in the
legal system as raising essential questions of justice. While alternative
versions of access to justice concept have not disappeared from the intellectual landscape completely, the connection between legal aid and
more fundamentally egalitarian concerns about the distribution of
wealth and power in society is hard to make out in the midst of a common presupposition that “access to justice” poses no more than a design
problem, with claims of justice amounting to no more than a mandate
for efficient resolution of this problem. This is a result with a distinct
ideological dimension, as it tends to obscure the role of political and
material inequalities in producing disparate outcomes in both the justice
system and the larger society—the very problem that many had once
hoped legal aid and access to justice measures could help to overcome.
The technocratic impulse has, in recent years, been taken to its
logical conclusion in an access to justice project implemented in the
New York State courts.89 Following draconian budget cuts in the 20112012 fiscal year, the New York court system implemented a celebrated
self-help forms program designed to “address barriers to access to justice that litigants face when they create their court papers.”90 The forms
(exploring the de-regulation of the Colorado legal market via a limited representation rule that
allows an attorney to provide discrete legal services to an otherwise pro se party and to charge
the client accordingly); Richard Zorza & David Udell, New Role for Non-Lawyers to Increase
Access to Justice, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1259 (2014) (surveying the current access to justice
reform initiatives and their results and noting that the “pressure for deregulation comes from the
perception that lawyer self-regulation is the cause of barriers to access”).
88
Richard Zorza, Access to Justice: The Emerging Consensus and Some Questions and Implications, 94 JUDICATURE 156, 156–57 (2011).
89 See Klempner, supra note 86, at 1204–14.
90 Id. at 1193.
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program began as a way to help ease interactions for people who typically came to court without lawyers because they were unable to afford
them: tenants in landlord and tenant court.91 As tenant’s forms program
began to meet with some success, the court then started making pro se
forms for landlords as well.92 This concession, while framed in terms
of providing access to justice, ignores the idea that some people already
have access to a bit more justice than others, and that the demands of
justice may therefore require a positive intervention on behalf of the
poor in order to level the playing field.
The New York courts’ concern with formal neutrality is symptomatic of a retreat from access to justice based on a model of full-service advocacy that could be a tool in the service of leveling class-based
power differentials in the justice system, to an increasingly common
view that access to justice is a mechanism for improving courtroom efficiency and spurring investment in technology. On a more fundamental
level, this development marks a turn away from more substantive egalitarian concerns, towards a thin conception of equality as consisting of
nothing more than the chance to buy a ticket in a social and economic
lottery, in which the odds of winning are vanishingly small. This turn
away from substantive equality between outcomes is similarly reflected
by a shift in the rhetoric employed by LSC and its leaders.93 As LSC has
become resigned to its inability to affect not only sweeping changes in
the law but also to scrape together sufficient funding to ensure a moderate level of representation of poor people in most of their day to day
legal problems, the agency has recast its aspirations to providing “some
form of effective assistance to 100% (emphasis added)” of its potential
clientele.94 One finds in subsequent iterations this already milquetoast
rendition of the agency’s mission diluted to the even more anemic slogan of “100% access” without a referent.95
IV. TECHNOLOGY
While not all of the technocratic solutions proposed in the access
to justice literature are expressly technological, the promise of technology as a way to fill the justice gap has emerged as a central preoccupation. A major source of this interest is no doubt LSC’s Technology
91

Id. at 1205–06.
Id. at 1208.
93 Summit Report, supra note 82, at 1.
94 Id.
95 See generally Greacen, et al., supra note 83.
92
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Initiative Grant (TIG) program, which incentivizes legal services providers to generate technological interventions to cope with what had become, by the time of the grant program’s creation, chronically inadequate levels of funding.96 The grant program was the suggestion of the
first summit LSC convened on the use of technology to improve access
to justice in 199897–a scant two years after the largest one-year drop in
funding in the Corporation’s history.98 Congress began approving funding for the program in 2000 and the grants have continued to be awarded
throughout the subsequent years.99 Over this period, LSC disbursed TIG
grants for two major categories of projects: upgrades to internal IT infrastructure for legal services agencies and development of end user applications.100 Examples of the latter include legal aid websites, self-help
legal forms, instructional videos, and online intake and “triage” web interfaces.101
TIG program’s technological imperative has been further promoted through an annual Technology Initiative Grants Conference,102
as well as a 2012 “Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access
to Justice,” which resulted in the publication of an official report by LSC
and a special issue of the Harvard Journal of Law and Technology reporting the proceedings of the first half of the summit.103 The mission
of the summit, as stated by the planning committee, was “to explore the
potential of technology to move the United States toward providing
some form of effective assistance to 100% of persons otherwise unable
to afford an attorney for dealing with essential civil legal needs.”104 The
resulting report, articulates a “vision of an integrated service-delivery
system” consisting of 5 components:
96

Technology Initiative Grant Program, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/grantsgrantee-resources/our-grant-programs/tig#Overview (last visited Dec. 17, 2018).
97 John Graecan, Introduction: Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J. L.
& TECH. 243, 244 (2013).
98 2013 LSC By the Numbers, supra note 41. Between 1995 and 1996, LSC experienced a 30.5% percentage change in funding. Id.
99 Technology Initiative Grant Program, supra note 96.
100 See 2012 TIG Project Descriptions, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/2012-tig-project-descriptions (last visited Dec. 20, 2018).
101 Id.
102 See Past TIG Conferences Materials, LEGAL SERVS. CORP., https://www.lsc.gov/meetingsevents/tig-conference/past-tig-conferences-materials (last visited Dec. 20, 2018). TIG has
hosted its annual legal aid technology conference since 2000 and is the only national event focused exclusively on the use of technology in the legal aid community. Id.
103 James E. Cabral et al., Using Technology to Enhance Access to Justice, 26 HARV. J. L. &
TECH. 243 (2012); Summit Report, supra note 82.
104 Summit Report, supra note 82, at 1.
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1. Creating in each state a unified “legal portal” which,
by an automated triage process, directs persons needing
legal assistance to the most appropriate form of assistance and guides self-represented litigants through the
entire legal process 2. Deploying sophisticated document
assembly applications to support the creation of legal
documents by service providers and by litigants themselves and linking the document creation process to the
delivery of legal information and limited scope legal representation 3. Taking advantage of mobile technologies
to reach more persons more effectively 4. Applying business process/analysis to all access-to-justice activities to
make them as efficient as practicable 5. Developing “expert systems” to assist lawyers and other services providers.105

A. Technology and Exclusion
While the Summit report106 and associated white papers107 are
long on visionary rhetoric, they are short on the sorts of empirical data
that might serve to justify the major premise of the TIG program: that
technology would effectively function as a lower cost replacement of
legal aid and thus succeed where society had failed at providing meaningful access to justice to the poor.
The need for such justification appears particularly pressing
given the prominent role of end user applications in the summit’s “vision.” The bearing of income and wealth on relative levels of computer
use and proficiency are well known.108 Moreover, as the “vision” was
outlined in the summit report, technology would play a key gatekeeping
role in determining the extent of the services available to prospective

105

Id. at 2.
Id.
107 James E. Cabral et al., supra note 103.
108 See JAN A.G.M. VAN DIJK, THE DEEPENING DIVIDE: INEQUALITY IN THE INFORMATION
SOCIETY (2005) (noting the societal and political implications on the deepening digital divide);
LISA J. SERVON, BRIDGING THE DIGITAL DIVIDE: TECHNOLOGY, COMMUNITY, AND PUBLIC POLICY
(2002) (assessing the policies in the United States designed to address the social problems created by low-income individuals’ lack of access to technology).
106
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clients in the initial “triage” step.109 In other words, technology would
be used to determine which clients would be provided with full service
by an attorney and which would be relegated to some form of self-help,
technologically assisted or otherwise.
A typical response to potential objections along these lines rebuffs such concerns with evidence that the “digital divide” is closing.
For example, Bonnie Rose Hough’s contribution to the summit papers
acknowledges the objections surrounding potential disadvantage to residents of rural areas that lack IT infrastructure, people with disabilities,
and people with limited English proficiency.110 However, the paper remains silent on the larger issue of whether the self-help with the assistance of technology really represents a reasonable alternative to fullservice legal representation.111 It concludes on an upbeat note, observing that:
When LSC and state courts began their statewide selfhelp websites, of the half of American adults without Internet access, 57% did not wish to gain access. Yet the
digital divide was never a sufficient reason not to make
maximal use of the Internet for persons who did have access to it. The percentage of Americans who use the Internet has continued to rise, reaching nearly 80% in
2011. Today, virtually everyone has some means of obtaining online access — whether through her own computer, through that of a relative or neighbor, or through a
public access computer at a court or public library.112
This emphasis on the digital divide presents a misleading dichotomy between technological “haves” and “have nots”, with the dividing
line between the two groups being determined by physical access to the
internet.113 This rhetorical framework tends to deflect questions that
would implicate a more nuanced analysis of the role that existing social
structures and inequalities play in peoples’ interactions with
Summit Report, supra note 82, at 2. The term “triage” is used to characterize a “range of
strategies for allocating scarce resources most effectively.” Id. at 13 n.4.
110 Bonnie Rose Hough, Let’s Not Make It Worse: Issues to Consider in Adopting New Technology, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 256, 261–63 (2012).
111
Id.
112 Id. at 266.
113 Mark Warschauer, Reconceptualizing the Digital Divide, FIRST MONDAY (July 1, 2002),
https://journals.uic.edu/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/967/888.
109
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technology.114 While virtually everyone may have some sort of physical
access to a computer, the quality of this access varies greatly with advantages and disadvantages conferred according to one’s level of
wealth.115 Even if one accepts that the nature of the problem is adequately captured in terms of an access/non-access binary, the evidence
technology boosters typically rely upon to establish that the digital divide is “closing”116 itself suggests that class continues to play a central
role in determining what side of the divide people find themselves on.
The same Pew research study that indicated that nearly 80% of Americans were using the internet in 2011 also indicated that only about 62%
of individuals with an annual household income of less than $30,000 a
year were using the internet, with higher rates of internet usage the farther up the income scale one went.117
B. Technology and Customer Service Ideology
When one considers that access to justice movement has historically been concerned with the quality of justice available to the poor,
the apparent indifference to the impact of poverty on the fairness and
efficacy of its technological vision seems puzzling. However, this indifference becomes easier to comprehend when one replaces the idea
of a client as a citizen seeking justice with the client as a customer or
consumer in the justice system.118 The idea of the “justice customer”
or consumer is a recurring theme in this literature, along with is the
concern with customer or consumer-oriented design of systems for administering legal justice.119 If potential clients are conceived as consumers—rationally self-interested actors seeking to maximize

114

Siobhan Stevenson, Digital Divide: A Discursive Move Away from the Real Inequities, 25
INFO. SOC’Y 1, 1–2 (2009).
115 Id.
116 Kathryn Zickuhr & Aaron Smith, Digital Differences, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Apr. 13, 2012),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/04/13/digital-differences/ (noting that “some” gaps in internet adoption have narrowed in the past, specifically the “gap closest to disappearing is that between whites and minorities” and differences in access have become “significantly less prominent over the years”).
117 Id.
118 See, e.g., Ronald W. Staudt, Technology for Justice Customers: Bridging the Digital Divide
Facing Self-Represented Litigants, 5 U. MD. L.J. RACE RELIG. GENDER & CLASS 71 (2005).
119 See, e.g., id.; Robert B. Yegge, Access to Justice, 40 JUDGE’S J. 4 (2001); OWEN ET AL., supra
note 84; Katherine Alteneder & Linda Rexer, Consumer Centric Design: The Key to 100% Access, 16 J.L. SOC’Y 5 (2014).
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utility120—in some sort of market for justice, the unconcern with actual
material inequalities as an impediment to effective use of the services
begins to reflect a perverse sort of logic. What the absorbing faith in
self-help technologies presume, and the phrase justice customer belies,
is an essentially economic conception of the person as, above all else,
an actor whose agency is expressed through actions and decisions that
take place within markets.121 This conception presupposes a radically
individualist idea of agency and utter disregard for inequalities—be
they material, social, or physical—as factors which may limiting or
preventing some people from doing things that seem quite trivial to
others. In this sense, moral standing is measured in market terms—
only insofar as individuals are able to engage in adequate levels of
“self-care” according to their choices in a given marketplace are they
worthy of moral consideration.122 The conclusion that follows from
this conception is that if a justice customer fails to take adequate care
by availing themselves of the new technological products in the justice
marketplace, they ultimately have only themselves to blame.
The foregoing explanation leaves some uncertainty surrounding the question of why designers should continue to bother with the
needs of low-income consumers who are, after all, only able to participate in the “market” for justice in an at best dysfunctional manner requiring state intervention. Even the presupposition that access to justice remains primarily concerned with the needs of the “justice
consumer” may still a bit off the mark. As Hilary Sommerlad phrased
it in a critique of neoliberal reforms of the United Kingdom’s legal aid
system, “the legal aid client is the product and her production is facilitated by her reconstruction as a self-entrepreneurial actor who should
be able to access justice with a minimal level of professional assistance.”123
The forgoing perspective helps to explain why so many contemporary discussions of access to justice slide seamlessly between the
language of justice and the language of efficiency as rationales for

120

Douglas A. Kysar, The Expectations of Consumers, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1700, 1762 (2003)
(recognizing that consumers are often defined as seeking to maximize utility).
121 Wendy Brown, American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization, 34 POL. THEORY 690, 694 (2006).
122 Id.
123 Hilary Sommerlad, Reflections on the Reconfiguration of Access to Justice, 15 INT’L J. LEGAL
PROF. 179, 188 (2008).
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their proposals.124 While overall system-wide efficiency matters little
from the perspective of a client, there are two ways in which efficiency
is a key interest of other actors in the legal system. For those who
work in the courts, efficiency translates into the ability to process
dockets with minimal friction, an interest which is jeopardized by a
glut of pro se litigants.125 Pro se litigants—unlike professional attorneys—cannot be depended upon to internalize the rules of the system
or the language used to communicate their positions to the court, with
the result that judges and other court staff are likely to require much
additional time reviewing their filings and interacting with them during court appearances.126 What is typically presented as providing access to justice for unrepresented individuals is actually more concerned with bringing standardization and order to their interactions
with the court—for example, through the use of electronically assembled forms—that will facilitate smooth processing of their claims.127
Once the original claim to justice is conflated with this efficiency aim,
the concern that some may be disadvantaged by the displacement of
professional service with self-help facilitated by technology is of less
concern than whether the system has introduced enough regularity to
the proceedings to be worth the cost of its development.
C. Access to Justice and Techno-Entrepreneurship
A second common meaning that efficiency takes on in the discussion of access to justice concerns the efficient allocation of the resources available to provide legal services.128 In this sense, what is efficient is that which optimizes the amount of justice dispensed, given
the amount of resources available. Leaving aside for a moment the dissonance introduced by the idea of plugging an immeasurable like justice into the cost-benefit calculus, this conception raises a larger question about what seems to be a rather bold assumption that technology
will necessarily deliver on this promise of efficiency. In candid
124

See, e.g., Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., Judicial Techniques for Cases Involving Self-Represented Litigants, JUDGE’S J. 16 (2003); Bonnie Rose Hough & Richard Zorza, Tech-Supported
Triage: The Key to Maximizing Effectiveness and Access, 26 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 292 (2012);
Chase T. Rogers, Access to Justice: New Approaches to Ensure Meaningful Participation, 90
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1447 (2015); Wolf, supra note 85; Summit Report, supra note 82.
125 See Rebecca A. Albrecht et al., supra note 124, at 16 (discussing the “dilemma” judges face
in trying to “facilitate” a pro se litigant while remaining impartial).
126
Stephan Landsman, The Growing Challenge of Pro Se Litigation, 13 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
439, 449 (2009).
127 See Summit Report, supra note 82.
128 See Raymond H. Brescia et al., supra note 85.
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moments, even the most enthusiastic proponents of technological solutions have admitted that there can be significant expense involved with
developing these solutions.129 If a central problem of legal services is
its inadequate levels of funding, why is expenditure on technology assumed to be necessarily a more efficient way of allocating scarce resources than direct expenditure on legal services?
Justification for this tendency to equate a technological solution with increased efficiency has been deemed largely unnecessary,
which suggests something significant about the normative assumptions
embedded in the TIG program and the literature celebrating it.130
Many popular depictions of high technology present it as forwardthinking, futuristic, morally and ideologically neutral, rendering many
possible claims about its future potential intuitively plausible.131 This
techno-optimistic impulse, combined with the neoliberal fetish for entrepreneurialism, generates ready acceptance of the idea of legal services providers should be encouraged as producers but especially as
consumers of technology. Congress began appropriating funds specifically for TIGs even at a time when overall agency funds were at an
all-time low in inflation-adjusted dollars.132 However, by limiting the
recipients discretion over the funds to the implementation of technological projects, it allowed TIGs to be recast from a pure social welfare
expenditure—disfavored in neoliberal discourse for its tendency to induce an unhealthy dependency on the state for services that ought to be
provided by individuals for themselves—to a means of seeding economic growth by creating a new market for technological developments, ultimate control over which remain in private hands.133
Ultimately, while legal representation remains difficult to commodify, the incorporation of technology into the provision of legal services allows the funding nominally allocated to that purpose to “trickle
up” to the private firms who develop, market, and maintain these

Staudt, supra note 86, at 1145 (“This emerging and fully transformative model for delivering
legal information and legal services to low-income people requires a significant investment in
core technologies.”).
130 See supra notes 96–105 and accompanying text.
131 Staudt, supra note 86, at 1145.
132 See 2013 LSC by the Numbers, supra note 41.
133 See Michael J. Carbone, Critical Scholarship on Computers in Education: A Summary Review, in CRITICAL APPROACHES TO INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY IN LIBRARIANSHIP 52 (1993)
(noting the potential for a “transform[ation] into a lucrative market for technological innovation”).
129
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tools.134 This is true not only in the case of the direct expenditure of
the grant to create the new program, which, in the grand scheme of the
federal budget, constitutes a fairly negligible amount.135 The development of new technological “initiatives” can lock grant recipients into
continued dependence on commercial vendors for service and updates,
requiring the agency to continue spending scarce discretionary funds
on continued maintenance over a number of years even after the initial
funds have been spent. Through these mechanisms, private firms are
afforded an ongoing and not altogether transparent voice over the
agency’s continuing priorities.136
CONCLUSION
The access to justice movement in the United States took root in
the mid-20th century welfare state and revolved around the creation of
a federally funded legal aid program.137 However, the history of publicly
funded legal aid was punctuated by acrimonious political battles almost
from the start. Eventually, Reagan’s presidential administration coupled
a revanchist posture toward the Legal Services Corporation with a more
general anti-welfare philosophy to induce a long period of decline in
funding for legal aid from which it has never recovered.138 This decline,
coupled with the broader pattern of rising wealth inequality, have contributed to the widening “justice gap” in America.
While contemporary access to justice initiatives are nominally
concerned with alleviating the justice gap, these measures now tend to
proceed from a narrow neoliberal frame wherein both poverty and inadequate financial support for public institutions and programs are taken
as a given. In years past, the goal of legal aid, especially when formulated as the concern with equal access to justice—carried with it a reminder of one of the tensions that lies at the heart of the American
134

For a discussion of the relationship between state programs and the upward redistribution of
wealth, see Werner Bonefeld, Free Economy and the Strong State: Some Notes on the State, 34
CAPITAL & CLASS 15, 16 (2010).
135 For example, in 1998 the overall federal budget comprised over 1.3 trillion dollars. See H.R.
Con. Res. 84, 105th Cong. (1997).
136 In a more obvious sense, LSC has also afforded Information Technology firms a privileged
voice in setting policy agendas through participation in the TIG conferences and summit. Attendance rosters from the 2012 Summit on the Use of Technology to Expand Access to Justice
indicate that a significant number of the participants in the by invitation only program were
senior officers in technology firms, there was not a single participant in the program drawn from
the rank and file of legal aid attorneys or their clients. See Summit Report, supra note 82.
137 See supra Part II.
138 See Falk & Pollak, supra note 26.
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justice system: in a legal system predicated on adversarial process,
where freedom from state infringement on the ability to hire the best
counsel that money can buy is a right regarded as sacrosanct, inequalities in wealth are all but guaranteed to affect outcomes in the courts. By
working to resolve this tension without addressing the underlying problem of inequality, the uncritical embrace of neoliberalism within the access to justice movement serves to undermine other possible visions of
legal aid (and the legal profession more broadly) as a democratizing
force capable of challenging the extant class structure.
As federal funding for legal services—along with the other tattered remnants of the American welfare state—have once again come
into the cross-hairs of a presidential budget proposal, it is likely that
legal aid lawyers along with other public service providers will continue
to face intensifying downward pressure to “do more with less” in the
coming years. While the forceful rejection the ideological framework
in which such austerity measures take place is not a sufficient condition
for successfully resisting those measures, it is undoubtedly a necessary
one.

